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BREACHES OF CONFIDENCE
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I. INTRODUCTION
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton engaged in a war of
words over a potential compromise of classified information
via email servers during the 2016 presidential election. Hillary
Clinton told CNN, “[i]t was a mistake for me to use personal
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email. And I regret that.”1 Ms. Clinton then commented during
the October 9, 2016, presidential debate that “it’s just awfully
good that someone with the temperament of Donald Trump is
not in charge of the law of our country.”2 Donald Trump
responded, “[b]ecause you’d be in jail.”3
The 2016 presidential election in the United States
brought the public release of classified information to the
forefront of discussion worldwide. However, this is not the first
time discussion as to the consequences for releasing classified
information into the public realm has occurred. From members
of Congress to journalists to military generals, there has been an
ongoing discussion in the United States about how to ensure

Elise Labott & M.J. Lee, Clinton reiterates email use was a 'mistake' as
State Dept. reopens probe, CNN Politics, July 8, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/politics/state-departmentreopens-probe-into-clinton-emails/, (last visited March 25, 2017);
Richard Pollock, State Dept Can’t Find Evidence Hillary Was Trained To
Handle Classified Documents, The Daily Caller, July 10, 2016,
http://dailycaller.com/2016/07/10/exclusive-state-dept-cant-findevidence-hillary-was-trained-to-handle-classified-documents/, (last
visited March 25, 2017). (Secretary Clinton did not know ‘(C)’ meant
the information was classified)
2 Aaron Blake, Everything that was said at the second Donald Trump vs.
Hillary Clinton debate, highlighted, Wash. Post., October 9, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/10/09/everything-that-was-said-at-the-seconddonald-trump-vs-hillary-clinton-debatehighlighted/?utm_term=.76c72fa0af9f, (last visited March 25, 2017).
3 Id.
1
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the protection of classified information and deter those with
access from releasing that information intentionally or
unintentionally. The distinction is frequently drawn between
the intentional release and negligent release, but that distinction
is not always sufficient to determine whether there should be
consequences for the individual releasing the information. The
following sections will discuss the numerous examples of how
the law on the release of classified information has been applied
previously and how that implementation was not always
consistent. Ultimately, the United States needs a single clear law
on classified information that is implemented consistently
across the board. The level of punishment should be
determined by the intent of the crime. However, those who
negligently disclose classified information should also receive
punishment; the fact that the classified information took a nonphysical form should not equate to a get out of jail free card.
This paper will investigate the current law as it relates
to the unlawful public release of classified information. Noting
that the federal government has used multiple statutes to
prosecute individuals that release classified information
inappropriately, the vast majority of the prosecutions utilize the
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Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 37 Sections 791-7994. The
primary sections of this act that have been utilized are 18 U.S.C.
§§ 793 and 794.5 As such, Part II of this paper will focus on the
required paperwork and training necessary to obtain a
government security clearance, as well as the use of the
Espionage Act, specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794,6 and the
common challenges to those provisions. This information will
provide an understanding of the current law, what federal
employees and contractors are told with respect to the access
and release of classified information, and how that law is
applied. This section includes a sampling of recent cases and
instances where the current law has been applied to individuals
and demonstrates the confusion and lack of consistency in the
application and prosecution of disclosure violations. In Part III
of this paper, the public’s perception of classified information
and what protection is given such information will be explored.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the laws pertaining to the

18 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-799 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114248).
5 18 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248); 18
U.S.C.A. § 794 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
6 Id.
4
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disclosure of classified information must be clarified and
consistently implemented to effectively protect classified
information. Specifically, (1) §§ 793 and 7947 should be
modified

and

simplified;

(2)

prosecutions

should

be

emphasized for both high profile government officials and lowlevel staff; (3) training of employees and contractors with
security clearances should be improved; and (4) the public
should be better informed as to the reasons information is made
classified and as to why government officials and contractors
cannot comment on the information.

II. CURRENT LAW AND TRAINING
There are three types of classified information when it
comes to national security interests: (1) Confidential, (2) Secret,
and (3) Top Secret.8 Confidential information is the lowest level
of classified information and is defined as information that

Id.
Northrop Grumman, Annual DoD Security Refresher Training,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiWuKLWzovSAhUDQiYKHbxbB6IQFggaMA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.northropgrumman.com%2FAboutUs
%2FDocuments%2FClearance%2Fannual_dod_refresher_ext.pdf&us
g=AFQjCNEBGi0CXrycDXt5EQ8dpcsUZB1hlA&bvm=bv.146786187,
d.eWE, (last visited March 25, 2017).
7
8
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could cause damage to national security if released. 9 The next
level of classified information, Secret, is defined as information
that could cause grave damage to national security if released. 10
Finally, the highest level of classification, Top Secret, is defined
as information that could cause exceptionally grave damage to
national security if released.11 A security clearance is required
to access any of these three types of classified information. 12 An
individual will know if a particular document is classified for a
number of reasons including that the document must be
labeled, the document must contain a specific coversheet,
electronic transmittal of the document requires an approved
secure communication system, and the document may only be
viewed in approved areas (e.g., may not be taken home) unless
approved by senior management.13 There is other information
that may not be released to the public but is not classified and
does not require a security clearance to access (e.g., Official Use

Id.
Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information,
DOD Manual Department of Defense Manual 5200.01, Volume 3,
Change 2, March 19, 2013.
9

10

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 115
Only Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive Information).14
This paper is focused on the classified information that requires
a security clearance for access.
A. TRAINING
Training

individuals

with

access

to

classified

information is required but may be slightly different among
federal agencies (e.g., the Department of Defense has specific
security manuals and annual training documents15). Generally,
an individual that is applying for a security clearance must
complete a 127-page form that addresses past personal and
professional life and experiences.16 These individuals are also
required to sign a nondisclosure agreement which states:
I have been advised that the unauthorized
disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent
handling of classified information by me could
cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign
nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge
classified information to anyone unless: (a) I
have officially verified that the recipient has
been properly authorized by the United States
Government to receive it; or (b) I have been
given prior written notice of authorization from
the United States Government Department or
Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency)
DOD, supra note 8; Dept. of Homeland Security, Safeguarding
Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official use Only) Information, MD
Number 11042.1, Jan. 6, 2005.
15 DOD, supra note 8; DOD, supra note 13.
16 SF86-10, Questionnaire For National Security Positions.
14
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responsible for the classification of information
or last granting me a security clearance that such
disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am
uncertain about the classification status of
information, I am required to confirm from an
authorized official that the information is
unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a
person as provided in (a) or (b), above. I further
understand that I am obligated to comply with
laws and regulations that prohibit the
unauthorized
disclosure
of
classified
17
information.
In addition to the nondisclosure agreement, additional

training regarding the handling of classified information is also
required annually. The training reminds security clearance
holders of their responsibilities and requirements for protecting
classified information.18 Unfortunately, the required annual
training is frequently not completed.19 For example, in 2009
only 20% of the cleared individuals at the State Department had
completed the required training.20 It was also reported that only

SF312-13, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement.
DOD, supra note 8.
19 Catherine Herridge, Fewer than one in five State Dept employees with
security clearance completed classified info training, FoxNews, Sept. 27,
2016, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/09/27/fewer-thanone-in-five-state-dept-employees-with-security-clearancecompleted-classified-info-training.html; Compliance Follow-up Review
of the Department of State’s Implementation of Executive Order 13526,
Classified National Security Information, AUD-SI-16-43, September
2016, (last visited March 25, 2017).
20 Id.
17
18

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 117
twenty-percent of the cleared State Department employees had
completed the training at least once since obtaining a
clearance.21 The Office of Inspector General was unable to
identify the number of State Department contractors that had
completed the training because the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security could not provide a complete list of all current
Department security-cleared contractors.22
B. CURRENT STATUTORY VIOLATIONS
The current statutes used to prosecute those who
unlawfully disclose classified information include everything
from theft of government information to espionage. However,
the vast majority of the prosecutions fall under the Espionage
Act as codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99.23 The key sections of this
law that address the release of classified information are
18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794, which restrict the gathering,
transmitting or losing defense information.24 The remaining
sections of the Espionage Act are more focused and less useful

Id.
Compliance Follow-up Review of the Department of State’s
Implementation of Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security
Information, AUD-SI-16-43, September 2016.
23 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 791-799.
24 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.
21
22
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for prosecutors. Specifically, § 791 has been repealed;25 § 792
involves harboring persons;26 § 795 involves photographing or
sketching defense facilities;27 § 796 involves using aircraft to
photograph defense facilities;28 § 797 involves publication and
sale of photographs of defense facilities;29 and § 798 involves
communication and cyphers.30 While each of these sections
could be used in specific situations, the more widely used
sections of §§ 793 and 794 focus on gathering and transmitting
information that could harm the defense of the United States. 31
As such, the remainder of this paper will focus on challenges
that have been made to §§ 793 and 794.32 The following
discussion provides a summary of the elements in each
subsection of §§ 793 and 794.33
Section 793(a) applies to those individuals who obtain
information with respect to the “national defense” with an

18 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-327).
18 U.S.C.A. § 792 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-327).
27 18 U.S.C.A. § 795 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
28 18 U.S.C.A. § 796 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
29 18 U.S.C.A. § 797 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 798 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
31 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.
32 Id.
33 Id. (The full text of the §§ 793 and 794 are provided in Attachment
1 for reference.)
25
26
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intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to
the injury of the U.S. or to the advantage of a foreign nation.34
These individuals might not have a security clearance but
trespass on a military base and take pictures of classified
military weapons projects or steal classified military plans. 35
Section 793(b) contains the same requirements and
reason as § 793(a), but the individual might not have been
successful in obtaining the classified material but merely
attempts to copy it. 36
Section 793(c) contains the same requirements as §
793(a) but applies to those individuals who are interested in
receiving such classified information.37 In addition, this
subsection specifically requires that the defendant know or
have reason to believe that the information was or will be
obtained in violation of this statute.38
Section 793(d) applies to individuals with security
clearance who are legally in possession or have access to the

18 U.S.C.A. § 793.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
34
35
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information and willfully provide such information to
individuals who do not have the requisite security clearance to
view the material.39 The classified information must be
“relating to the national defense” and can include writings and
code books.40 The defendant must also have reason to believe
that the information could be used to injure the United States or
aid a foreign nation.41 It is also a violation when a defendant has
possession of the information and refuses to produce it when
asked by U.S. officials.42 This section was used for one of the
charges against Edward Snowden.
Section 793(e) contains the same requirements as §
793(d); however, this subsection applies to those who find
themselves unlawfully coming into contact with such material
and then distributing it to other such individuals not authorized
to receive the information.43 For example, the media outlet with
unlawful access passing the information on to the public.

Id.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
39
40
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Section 793(f) also requires that the defendant have
lawful possession of the information (e.g., document, code
book, etc.) and that the information is “relating to the national
defense.”44 However, this section applies to those individuals
with a security clearance who are grossly negligent and allow
such material to fall into the hands of those not cleared.45 The
gross negligent mens rea requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)
includes the loss of classified information due to negligence
(e.g., forgetting it). 46 Examples of a negligent disclosure are
Secretary Clinton’s email server or a secret service agent leaving
a laptop with classified information in a car which is stolen. In
addition, the defendant is also in violation of this subsection if
he or she has knowledge of the event and fails to report it to his
superior officer.47
Section 793 prescribes a punishment of a fine and
imprisonment not more than ten years.48 Under the U.S. federal
sentencing guidelines, with no prior criminal history, the

Id.
Id.
46 United States v. Gonzalez, 16 M.J. 428, 429-430 (1983).
47 Id. (Section 793 (g) is the conspiracy provision while § 793 (h)
addresses forfeiture of property under this statute).
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 793.
44
45
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imprisonment for violation of this section varies depending on
the details and the subsection violated as shown in the
following table.49
Section

Top Secret
Information

Other Classified
Information

793 (a)

168-210 months

97-121 months

793 (b)

168-210 months

97-121 months

793 (c)

168-210 months

97-121 months

168-210 months or
87-108 months
793 (d)

Depending on the
details of the
violation
168-210 months or

793 (e)

793 (f)

87-108 months

794

51-63 months
Depending on the
details of the violation
97-121 months or
51-63 months

Depending on the
details of the
violation

Depending on the
details of the violation

27-33 months

12-18 months

168-210 months or
793 (g)

97-121 months or

87-108 months

97-121 months or
51-63 months

Depending on the
details of the
violation

Depending on the
details of the violation

360 months – life

210-262 months

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §§2M3.22M3.4 (Nov. 2016).
49
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Similar to § 793(a), § 794(a) applies to any individual
(with or without a security clearance) that obtains material with
respect to the “national defense” and passes on such material
with the intent or a reason to believe that it is to be used to the
injury of the U.S. or advantage of a foreign nation. 50 In addition
to § 793(a) requirements, this subsection requires that that
information be provided to, or an attempt was made to provide
the information to a foreign country. 51 For example, it would be
difficult to prosecute Secretary Clinton or General Petraeus
under this section unless there was some proof that they
intended or had reason to know the actions would result in
delivery of classified information to a foreign nation and it
would injure the U.S. or be an advantage to the foreign nation.
The section sets out the penalties and when they may be
applied.52 Specifically, § 794 prescribes a punishment of death
or imprisonment for any term of years up to life. 53 Under the

18 U.S.C.A. § 794.
Id.
52 Id. (§ 794 (b) addresses the release of information during a time of
war. In addition, § 794 (c) addresses a conspiracy with respect to this
statute while § 794 (d) addresses forfeiture of property under this
statute).
53 Id.
50
51
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U.S. federal sentencing guidelines, with no prior criminal
history, the imprisonment for violation of this section is 360
months to life for Top Secret classified information and between
210-262 months for other classified information.54
The Espionage Act has many nuances and specifics that
are required to obtain a conviction under the statute. The result
is a confusing set of laws that require significant interpretation
by the courts. This confusion is what defendants have
frequently challenged to avoid conviction under the Espionage
Act. Some of the primary examples of these challenges are the
focus of the following section.
C. CHALLENGE TO THE ESPIONAGE ACT
There is a fair amount of case history associated with 18
U.S.C. §§ 793-94 challenging various sections and arguing that
phrases are void for vagueness, that various mens rea
requirements are not clear or met, that the statute violates the
free speech

and self-incrimination rights

of the U.S.

Constitution and that the statute violates the Congressional

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §2M3.1
(Nov. 2016).
54
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requirements associated with treason.

55

We address each of

these challenges in the following discussion.
One of the primary challenges that has been made to §§
793 and 794 has been with respect to the phrase “national
defense.” 56 Each subsection of § 793 and subsection (a) of § 794
use the phrase “national defense” when addressing the type of
information that is covered by that specific subsection.57
The Supreme Court has defined the phrase “national
defense.”58 Specifically, the Court held in United States v. AbuJihaad that “national defense” is not defined in the code but has
been consistently interpreted by the courts to be a “generic
concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and
naval establishments and the related activities of national
preparedness.”59 The Court then discussed limitations on the
use of this phrase in a prosecution.60 The Court indicated that
the information must be “closely held.”61 This limitation was

18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.
Id.
57 Id.
58 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.Supp.2d 362, 385-88 (D. Conn.
2009).
59 Id. at 385.
60 Id. at 386-88.
61 Id. at 386.
55
56
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explained by the Court by noting that a conviction could not be
maintained if the defendant collected the information from
publicly available sources and pieced it together on his own. 62
The Court explained that if the Government did not keep the
information secret, then use of the information was not a
violation of the espionage laws.63 This is distinguishable from
the issues surrounding Edward Snowden because the
government did protect that information but it was stolen by
someone with a security clearance. Further, individuals with a
security clearance are trained that they must have a need-toknow to view classified information; therefore, they are not
allowed to view WikiLeaks information that may be classified
and must not confirm or deny any information associated with
those leaks.64 The Court went further to explain that the statute
does not strictly require the information be classified for a
prosecution, but classification of the information is an
important consideration in determining if the information falls
under the statute.65 The Court has also clarified that “national

Id.
Id.
64 DOD, supra note 8.
65 Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.Supp.2d at 387.
62
63
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defense” is not restricted to military activities and facilities (e.g.,
a study of a worldwide communication satellite system by the
Central Intelligence Agency).66 In 2011, the Supreme Court
rejected claims that “national defense” was too vague to allow
implementation via the statute.67
Some defendants have also attempted to use the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis (“words are generally known by the
company they keep”) to argue that “information relating to the
national defense” is not clear as to whether it applies to tangible
information, intangible information, or both. 68 However, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kim concluded that the statute
provides an appropriate standard of conduct and is not vague.69
In United States v. Kiriakou, the Court clarified that “information
regarding the national defense” consists of tangible and
intangible information in § 793(d).70 Tangible information
would include things such as books and documents while
intangible information would be knowledge. 71 The difference

United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Drake, 818 F.Supp.2d 909, 916-19 (D. Md.2011).
68 United States v. Kim, 808 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C.2011).
69 Id. at 51-53.
70 United States v. Kiriakou, 898 F.Supp.2d 921, 923 (E.D. Va. 2012).
71 Id.
66
67
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between the two in the statute depends on the mens rea in the
subsection with intangible property requiring a “reason to
believe could cause injury” or a bad faith requirement.72
Still, other phrases in the various statutes have also been
challenged for vagueness. The military courts addressed the
“unauthorized possession” language in § 793(e) and concluded
that authorized possession turns into unauthorized possession
when the individual exceeds the scope of the authorization that
was provided to him.73 The defense argued in United States v.
McGuinness that because the defendant was authorized to
access the information, he did not have “unauthorized
possession.”74 18 U.S.C § 793(f) has been challenged by
indicating that the phrase in the statute that says the violator
“permits” the information to be removed prohibits its
application if the defendant removed the classified materials
himself.75 Thus, the defendant did not “permit” someone to
access the information because he took it himself.76 The military

Id. at 923-24.
United States v. McGuinness, 33 M.J. 781, 786 (1991); United States
v. McGuinness, 35 M.J. 149, 152-53 (1992).
74 McGuinness, 33 M.J. at 784; McGuinness, 35 M.J. at 152.
75 United States v. Roller, 37 M.J. 1093 (1993).
76 Id.
72
73
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courts rejected this challenge and indicated that the defendant
removing the information himself was still “permitting” the
classified information to be removed as defined in the statute. 77
In 2011, the Supreme Court also rejected claims that
“willfulness” was too vague to allow implementation via §
793(e).78
Another frequent challenge to convictions under §§ 793794 centers around the mens rea and the mindset of the
individual that was charged with violation of the statute. 79 This
challenge has also been addressed by the courts. For example,
the Supreme Court ruled that a conviction under § 793(d)
requires proof that the defendant was legally in possession of
the material, the material must be “associated with the national
defense”, and the defendant must have tried to provide that
information to someone that was not authorized to have the
material.80 In 2009, the Supreme Court clarified that in addition
to the defendant having lawful possession of the material, the
material being related to “the national defense”, and the

Id.
Drake, 818 F.Supp.2d at 916-19.
79 18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.
80 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721-22 (1989).
77
78
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material being provided to someone not authorized to receive
it, § 793(d) also requires that the information be communicated
willfully and the defendant must have a reason to believe the
information could harm the United States or help a foreign
government.81 In 1971, the United States Court of Military
Appeals indicated that § 793(d) required willfulness, but did
not require bad faith was for a conviction under the statute.82
The military courts have also provided explanation and
clarification on the mens rea required for the espionage laws.
The courts explained the various levels of mens rea by
explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) requires bad faith, whereas §
793(e) requires only willfulness and § 793(f) requires gross
negligence.83
The Supreme Court also addressed the distinction
between § 793(d) and § 794(a).84 The Court held that § 793(d)
only addresses those individuals who are trusted with the
classified information and subsequently violated that trust.85

United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.Supp.2d 362, 384, 388 (D. Conn.
2009).
82 United States v. Attardi, 20 USCMA 548, 554 (1971).
83 United States v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, 132-33 (2010).
84 Hoffman, 995 F.Supp.2d at 565.
85 Id.
81
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The Court held that § 793(d) may be used to prosecute the
individual for attempting to provide the information to anyone
not entitled to receive it.86 Conversely, according to § 794(a) it is
irrelevant

how

the

individual

received

the

classified

information; the fact that the person has the information and
attempted to provide it to a foreign government is adequate for
this element of the crime. 87 As such, § 794(a) is broader than §
793(d) as it relates to the details of the case (e.g., how the
information was obtained) and therefore easier to prosecute.88
Prosecutors have also charged individuals when the
recipient of the information was not a foreign government
news. In 1985, defense attorneys argued that § 793(e) was not
applicable when classified information is released to the press. 89
The Court concluded that the United States would be just as
harmed by a release of information to the press as release to a
single individual.90

Id.
Id.
88 Id.
89 United States v. Morison, 604 F.Supp. 655, 657-58 (D. Md.1985).
90 Id. at 660, 662; United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1063-68 (4th
Cir.1988).
86
87
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Defense

attorneys

have

also

argued

that

the

requirement to produce information when requested under §
793(e) was a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights
because such production required the defendant to incriminate
himself by admitting he had possession of the information. 91
However, the Court concluded that this claim was not material
as there is no provision in the statute to punish an individual
that has possession of classified information but returns that
information when requested by the government (i.e., one
element of the crime is to willfully retain or fail to return the
classified information).92 As such, the military courts and the
Supreme Court both concluded that requiring the return of
classified information does not violate a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights.93
Defendants have also challenged the Espionage Act by
claiming that it violates the Treason Clause of the U.S.
Constitution because the activities in the Espionage Act are not

Morison, 604 F.Supp. at 657-58.
Id. at 660-62; Morison, 844 F.2d at 1063-68.
93 Morison, 604 F.Supp. at 657-58; United States v. Oxfort, 44 M.J. 337,
338-43 (1996).
91
92
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specifically defined in the Constitution.94 However, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress has the authority to
specify other conduct that is not equivalent to treason but still
punishable under the espionage laws.95 Similarly, the Court
rejected a claim that the government was not consistent in what
they prosecute under the statute and therefore it was
impossible for the defendant to know what was illegal.96 The
Court explained that this argument does not hold any water for
a number of reasons including the government’s difficulty of
meeting the elements of the conviction and the complications of
having a trial with classified information.97 In the same case, the
Court rejected a claim that oral communication of classified
information was protected as free speech under the First
Amendment to the Constitution.98
In United States v. Rosen, one of the most well-known
cases on espionage, the defendants argued § 793 violated the
First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

Kim, 808 F.Supp.2d. 44.
Id. at 50.
96 Id. at 55.
97 Id.
98 Id.
94
95
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however, these challenges were rejected by the Court.99 The
Court noted that this was not a blanket exemption from a First
Amendment challenge but must be considered on a case by case
basis.100 Specifically, the Court held that individuals that work
for or with the government frequently have a contractual
arrangement of some type and could be prosecuted without
violating the First Amendment, but individuals not associated
with the government could only be prosecuted if the release of
information was directly related to national security.101 The
Court also clarified that release of classified information implies
the government has indicated it is accurate and could still result
in a conviction under § 793, even if the information was already
available to the public.102 The Court in Rosen rejected a claim
that the information was received orally and therefore could
not be confirmed to be classified when released.103 The Court
also rejected a claim that the defendants did not receive fair
warning of how the statute would be applied.104
D. EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF CURRENT LAW
United States v. Rosen, 445 F.Supp.2d 602, 607 (E.D. Va. 2006).
Id. at 632.
101 Id. at 635-39.
102 Id. at 620.
103 Id. at 623.
104 Id. at 627-28.
99

100
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As noted by the Supreme Court, prosecutions under §
793 are not frequent, presumably due to the tight restrictions
placed on successful prosecution within the language of the
statute itself.105 However, there have been some recent
examples of prosecutions using § 793. For example, in United
States v. Hitselberger, the defendant was charged under § 793(e)
for removing and retaining documents associated with national
defense, among other charges beyond the Espionage Act such
as removing public documents from a secure location.106 The
defendant made a conscious effort to hide the classified
material and sneak it out undetected.107 In another case, a
retired Navy radioman was court-martialed and sentenced to
eight years in prison for conducting espionage for the
government of the Philippines when he collected and stole
classified communication information in violation of § 793(d).108
Theresa Marie Squillacote was convicted of espionage,

Id. at 613.
United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F.Supp.2d 130, 133 (D.D.C.
2014); United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F.Supp.2d 101, 102 (D.D.C.
2013).
107 Hitselberger, 991 F.Supp.2d at 134.
108 Allen v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 677, 678 (2000); United States v.
Allen, 31 M.J. 572 (1990).
105
106
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including § 793(b) and § 794(a), on behalf of Germany and
sentenced to just under 22 years imprisonment when she copied
and attempted to transmit classified documents to various
foreign governments.109 Abu-Jihaad was convicted of espionage
under statutes including § 793(d) and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment for transferring classified information to Azzam
Publications in support of jihad.110 There were also some other
cases prior to 2000 where defendants were convicted under §
793 subsections (a)-(g) and § 794 subsections (a)-(b).111 The one
common theme in these cases is that each defendant was
making an intentional, conscious effort to collect and steal the
classified information.

III. PUBLIC PERCEPTION
In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514, 514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 362.
111 McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975); Truong Dinh Hung
v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978); Morison v. United States, 486
U.S. 1306 (1988); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d
Cir.1952); United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.1958);
Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 392 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.1968);
Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 537 F.2d 1182 (4th Cir.1976); United
States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Pollard,
959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.1992); United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d
1233 (7th Cir.1979); United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th
Cir.1979); United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.1979); United
States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir.1993); United States v.
Forbrich, 758 F.2d 555 (11th Cir.1985); Coplon v. United States, 191
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.1951); Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C.
Cir.1962);United States v. Kostadinov, 572 F.Supp. 1547 (
S.D.N.Y.1983); United States v. Lee, 79 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.N.M.1999).
109
110
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The public is not trained or knowledgeable of the
requirements associated with classified information and how it
must be protected. As a result, the public gets most, if not all, of
their information and knowledge from the media and news
articles. Unfortunately, the news media is also uninformed and
lacks the knowledge to inform the public as to the requirements
associated with classified information. For example, the media
reported extensively on some high-profile cases such as
Edward Snowden. A vast majority of the discussion and articles
that have been published by the media about Snowden have
focused on whether Snowden is a hero or a villain.112 The same
type of discussion of Secretary Clinton’s emails has been raging
in the media as demonstrated during the 2016 Presidential
election. So, how does the information provided in the media

Nate Fick, Was Snowden hero or traitor? Perhaps a little of both,
Wash. Post, January 19, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/was-snowden-heroor-traitor-perhaps-a-little-of-both/2017/01/19/a2b8592e-c6f0-11e6bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.1d3c2b2b0235, (last
visited March 25, 2017); Amnesty International, Edward Snowden is a
hero not a traitor, https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/takeaction/edward-snowden-hero-not-traitor/, (last visited March 25,
2017); John Cassidy, Why Edward Snowden is a Hero, The New Yorker,
June 10, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/news/johncassidy/why-edward-snowden-is-a-hero, (last visited March 25,
2017).
112
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relate to the information available from the actual government
agencies responsible for protecting classified information?
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law published an article about the lack of protection
for whistleblowers as it relates to national security. 113 This
article stated, “existing legal protections for whistleblowers are
limited and generally do not extend to leaks of classified
information.”114 The article also stated that recent orders that
are intended to address this issue are not adequate and that no
disclosure is protected from criminal prosecution.115 In reality,
this article is incredibly misleading. While it is true that simply
releasing classified information is not allowed, it is not true that
whistleblowers are unprotected if classified information is
involved.

The

Intelligence

Community

Whistleblower

Protection Act (ICWPA) of 1998 discussed how to use secure
methods to report issues associated with classified information

National Security Whistleblowing: A Gap in the Law, Brennan Center
for Justice, Aug. 21, 2013,
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-securitywhistleblowing-gap-law, (last visited March 25, 2017).
114 Id.
115 Id.
113
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to Congress.116 When appropriate concerns are reported
through this manner, the whistleblower is protected. 117 This
was emphasized in a 2007 report for Congress on the
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) which stated:
The WPA protects ‘any’ disclosure evidencing a
reasonable belief of specified misconduct, a
cornerstone to which the MSPB [Merit Systems
Protection Board] remains blind. The only
restrictions are for classified information or
material the release of which is specifically
prohibited by statute. Employees must disclose
that type of information through confidential
channels to maintain protection; otherwise there
are no exceptions.118
As noted by reports for Congress and the Inspector
General, protection is provided for whistleblowers using
classified information, but they must follow a specified
procedure to ensure proper protection of that classified
information.119 The Brennan Center report that is available to
the public is inaccurate with respect to whistleblowers and

Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA),
http://www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower/icwpa.html, (last
visited March 25, 2017).
117 Id.
118 L. Paige Whitaker, The Whistleblower Protection Act: An Overview
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL
33918, March 12, 2007).
119 Id.; ICWPA, supra note 118.
116
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classified information and misleads the public on the topic.120
This inaccuracy is also proven false by reviewing the federal
training on whistleblowers.121 The training specifically states
that classified information may be released in a whistleblower
action, but it must be in a proper manner and location.122 For
example, if Edward Snowden had developed concerns with
how the National Security Agency was using metadata, he
could have sent the information via specified secure means to
the Inspector General or called a Defense hotline for further
instructions on how to communicate the concern.
The Washington Post also ran an opinion article about
the myths associated with classified information.123 In this

Brennan, supra note 115.
Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Unauthorized Disclosures of
Classified Information Text Alternative, The Nat’l Counterintelligence
and Sec. Ctr., Sept. 2011,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web
&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwiVd2s0ovSAhVQ3yYKHVhvBZYQFggcMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.ncsc.gov%2Ftraining%2FWBT%2Fdocs%2FUDB_091211.pdf&us
g=AFQjCNGb0e2d1m1Q-i36NWFPCxe6w5rgg&bvm=bv.146786187,d.eWE, (last visited March 25, 2017).
122 Id.
123 Elizabeth Goitein, Myths on Classified Information, Wash. Post.,
Sept. 18, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fivemyths-about-classified-information/2015/09/18/a164c1a4-5d7211e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html?utm_term=.bc4c41e9cd65, (last
visited March 25, 2017).
120
121

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 141
article, the Washington Post claims that even if an official
decides that disclosure would be harmful if released, he or she
is not required to make the information classified.124 To the
contrary, it is impossible for an uncleared news reporter to
determine what information is improperly classified. Nor does
the article offer any evidence or reference to support this false
claim. Rather the Department of Defense manual discusses
required training for those who make classification decisions.125
The training emphasizes avoiding over-classification.126 In
other words, the individuals must classify information based on
content and not on whether the information would be harmful.
The Washington Post then states that derivative
classification can be performed by any individual that can
access the information.127 This demonstrates a lack of
understanding of classification. In reality, there are two types of
classification,

original

classification

and

derivative

classification.128 Original classification is the determination as to

Id.
DOD, supra note 13.
126 Id.
127 Goitein, supra note 125.
128 DOD, supra note 8.
124
125
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whether information should be classified or not. 129 The original
classification authority is only available to persons who have a
“unique mission with responsibility in one of the subject areas
prescribed.” 130 These individuals are specifically designated
and do not include all employees.131 Derivative classification
occurs when information is derived from other classified
information.132 This results in the new document being
classified, but that derivative classifier (i.e., the person
generating the document with the derivative information) is not
determining whether the original information should or should
not be classified.133 Similarly, the Department of Defense
indicates that derivative classifiers must be properly trained
and an individual not trained may not serve as a derivative
classifier.134
The Washington Post article goes on to indicate that
there is no protection for whistleblowers.135 As discussed

Id.
DOD, supra note 13.
131 DOD, supra note 8.
132 Id.; DOD, supra note 13.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Goitein, supra note 125.
129
130
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previously, there are many ways that whistleblowers are
protected when it comes to classified information, but there is a
requirement to follow a specific process.136
The Washington Post article also indicates that our
classification system does not protect individuals from harm
and proposes an easy fix is that declassification should be
automatic after a set period of time.137 These claims are made
based on assumptions that are not substantiated in any way.
President Eisenhower once stated “[I]t is mandatory that the
United States protect itself against hostile or destructive
activities by preventing unauthorized disclosures of classified
information relating to the national defense . . . .”138 Current
world events more than destroy the claim for automatic
declassification. The United States built a nuclear weapon
during World War II. Countries today, such as North Korea or
Iran, would be happy to get any information used during that
effort, even if the technology is old and inefficient. Automatic

L. Paige Whitaker, The Whistleblower Protection Act: An Overview
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL
33918, March 12, 2007); ICWPA, supra note 118.
137 Goitein, supra note 126.
138 Hutson v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 860 F.Supp. 6, 12 (D.
Mass.1994).
136
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declassification would essentially put military technology and
nuclear weapons in the hands of every country around the
globe. These claims by the Washington Post associated with
classified information serve to further mislead and confuse the
public at large.
One cannot describe the public’s understanding of
classified information without discussing Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s emails. Numerous news articles implied that
these activities were prevalent throughout the government. For
example, reports indicated that Secretary Clinton was not
trained on proper handling of classified materials.139 The
implication, whether intentional or not, is that if the Secretary
of State does not get training, then it is likely most individuals
with access to classified information are not trained. While
reports indicate that a large percentage of employees were not
trained in the State Department,140 there is no information that
this is prevalent among other federal agencies that handle

Richard Pollock, State Dept Can’t Find Evidence Hillary Was Trained
To Handle Classified Documents, The Daily Caller, July 10, 2016,
http://dailycaller.com/2016/07/10/exclusive-state-dept-cant-findevidence-hillary-was-trained-to-handle-classified-documents/, (last
visited March 25, 2017).
140 Herridge, supra note 19.
139
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classified information. Other high-profile cases in the recent
past have led the public to believe that classified information is
not protected adequately and perhaps does not need to be.
Specifically, General David Petraeus admitted to allowing
unauthorized individual access to classified information. 141
General Petraeus plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of
mishandling classified information resulting in a fine and two
years of probation but no jail time.142
What these articles do not report is that great lengths are
taken to protect our nation’s secrets. For example, the Court has
protected classified information during hearings and trials
indicating that the information may be protected from public
release if it is a matter of national security, but methods should
be used to ensure the protection does not affect the defendant’s

Jessica McBride, David Petraeus: Why He Was Charged & Hillary
Clinton Wasn’t, Heavy, July 6, 2016,
http://heavy.com/news/2016/07/david-petraeus-hillary-clintonjames-comey-press-statement-classified-information-scandal-nocharges-charged-criminal-charges-emails-paula-broadwell-affairdonald-trump-reaction/; Adam Thorp, Was there a double standard on
the investigations of David Petraeus and Hillary Clinton?, PolitiFact, July
7, 2016, http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2016/jul/07/trump-revives-accusation-doublestandard-between-c/, (last visited March 25, 2017).
142 Id.
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right to a fair trial. 143 This disconnect is exacerbated by the fact
that individuals with access to classified information are
trained to neither confirm, deny, nor comment on any
information that may be available to the public. 144

IV. NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE CURRENT LAW
Given the current state of the law and the application of
that law, there are many changes that are warranted to ensure
the safety and security of our national secrets. This section
proposes four changes to the law and how these changes can be
applied to advance national security interests. These changes
include: (1) revisions and clarification of the Espionage Act, (2)
consistent prosecutions, (3) improved training, and (4) better
explanations to the public at large.

A. CHANGES NEEDED TO THE ESPIONAGE ACT
First, it is evident from the case law that there has been
much confusion about the application of §§ 793 and 794. As
with any law, defendants and defense attorneys consistently try
to find ways to avoid conviction under the law. A frequent

United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 515 (4th Cir.2013); 18
U.S.C.A. § APP. 3 §§ 4 and 6 (West, Westlaw current through P.L.
114-327. Also includes P.L. 114-329 and 115-1 to 115-18. Title 26
current through 115-18.).
144 DOD, supra note 8.
143
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challenge that has been applied in defense arguments has been
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, particularly as it
relates to the phrase “national defense.” While the courts have
made an effort to broadly define national defense in this
context, it is still very limiting with respect to classified
information. If there is not a direct link between the acts of the
defendant and national defense, then §§ 793-794 cannot be
applied.145 It would be easy to visualize material that the
government could consider classified but that is not directly
related to national defense or related activities as defined by the
courts (e.g., commercial nuclear reactors, Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act warrants).146 There is a heavy responsibility
that should go along with having a security clearance. This
responsibility should not depend on whether the classified
information accessed is related to national defense or is simply
considered

classified

for

other

reasons.

For

example,

commercial nuclear reactors would certainly have the potential
to involve classified information. However, if the reactor is only

18 U.S.C.A. § 793; 18 U.S.C.A. § 794.
50 U.S.C.A § 1801 et seq. (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114327. Also includes P.L. 114-329 and 115-1 to 115-18. Title 26 current
through 115-18.).
145
146
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associated

with

generation

of

electricity

for

public

consumption, it would likely be difficult to justify the national
defense element of this statute. This type of information could
certainly be a concern for the security of the American people if
it were to fall into the hands of a rogue nation or terrorist
organization. The restriction to tie the release of classified
information to national defense is needlessly narrow. The term
“national defense” should be stricken from the statue and in its
place state that anything designated classified (e.g., Top Secret,
Secret, or Confidential) is protected by the statute. Classified
information has been classified for a reason, and this material
must be protected for any number of reasons that may or may
not be related to national defense. If there is a true need to
protect national defense information that is not classified, then
that should be addressed in a separate statute as it is best to
clarify the statute and

keep it

simple and

concise.

Unfortunately, the existing statute has resulted in confusion by
trying to provide detail in the “national defense” language.
Along those same lines, parts of the statute require a
“reason to believe” that the information would injure the
United States and willful or grossly negligent behavior to be
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applicable. However, the responsibility that goes with having
access to classified information should be much more simply
defined. The statute should simply criminalize the willful
release of classified information regardless of what the
individual believed would happen with the information. The
fact that the information is classified should be sufficient to put
the individual on notice that it could injure the United States if
released. The mens rea should be the intent to release that
information.
Similarly, negligent treatment of classified material
should continue to be treated as a crime. The mens rea would
come from the knowledge that the information is classified so
that reckless handling of the information results in the mens rea
of not protecting classified information. The approach of the
current statute that willful release incurs a more severe
punishment than negligent release should be maintained. The
recent issues surrounding Secretary Clinton and General
Petraeus illustrate this point. There is no argument that
Secretary Clinton intended to release classified information and
harm the United States with her email server. However, the fact
that other entities could have accessed that information does
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not lessen the impact. If U.S. spies were identified through those
emails and subsequently found by foreign governments, the
argument that Secretary Clinton did not intend to harm the U.S.
or those individuals does not change the fact that the harm
occurred. As such, if Secretary Clinton knew the information
was classified and did not protect it accordingly, then she
would fall under the negligent release of classified information
in this approach. Similarly, General Petraeus admitted to
knowing the information he released was classified and
intentionally released it anyway. He would fall under the
intentional release of classified information in this approach.
Similarly, the current statute draws a distinction
between physical information (e.g., books) and intangible
knowledge. This adds confusion and should be removed.
Regardless of whether the classified information is tangible or
intangible, there is a serious potential to harm the security
interests of the United States.
Finally, the sources and methods used for protection of
classified information must also be protected. This type of
protection should be clearer in the statute to emphasize the
importance and lack of distinction between the methods and
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the final information. One only need look at the damage done
by Edward Snowden to understand that the methods of
collecting classified information can be just as important as the
information itself. The statute should specify that discussion of
the methods and sources of classified information is also
punishable under the statute. By making these changes in the
statute, there will be a great deal of clarity and consolidation
that will occur.

B. MORE CONSISTENT PROSECUTIONS
While the changes proposed will add clarity and allow
easier

prosecution

for

releasing

unlawfully

classified

information, the key to the protection of the sensitive
information is to punish violators of the statute. As noted in the
referenced cases, the majority of §§ 793 and 794 prosecutions
have been of government employees and contractors where the
defendant made a conscious effort to steal information and
provide that information to a foreign government or news
outlet, knowing that the information is classified and protected
by the government. However, when the defendant is a high
profile or famous individual, suddenly the rules do not seem to
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apply. The two prime examples are former Secretary of State
Clinton and General Petraeus.
In the case of Secretary Clinton, there was no desire to
go through the headaches of prosecuting her for failing to
protect classified information in violation of § 793(f). At present,
there has been no consequence at all for Secretary Clinton with
respect to failing to follow the appropriate requirements for
classified information. This failure may have resulted in the
release of classified information. Similarly, General Petraeus
was prosecuted but avoided any type of significant penalty by
pleading guilty to a lesser offense. The lack of any true
consequence for release of classified information by Clinton and
Petraeus shows the staff-level employees and public that there
really is no downside to trying to make money based upon
access to classified information and/or bypass security
protocols. This type of publicity serves to demoralize the
government work force and make individuals with a security
clearance ask themselves why they need to be diligent in
protecting classified information. If senior military and political
officials routinely skirt or intentionally violate the rules and
there is no punishment, what is the point? In addition to the
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need for a revised and clarified law on release of classified
information, there needs to be a renewed and focused effort to
prosecute violators of that law. These prosecutions must start at
the top and work their way down to the staff level. A serious
effort to enforce the rules will put everyone on notice, including
political officials, that the security of our nation is paramount
and will not be compromised at any level by anyone. The result
will be an effort to emphasize proper handling of classified
material and a much safer and secure country. Letting
individuals off with no real penalty simply encourages and
emboldens the next person to do the same thing, whether for
monetary or political gain.

C. IMPROVED TRAINING TO ACCESS CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
Not only must there be changes made to the Espionage
Act, but improvements must be made to the training of those
who hold security clearances. As noted previously, there are
multiple examples where training for handling of classified
information is not consistently implemented. The real problem
with the training falls into two areas. First, there is no real
consequence for failing to complete classified material training.
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The former Secretary of State did not complete the training and
was allowed to run for President of the United States. In theory,
failing to complete the training can result in revocation of the
individual’s security clearance, and thus restriction from access
of classified material; however, in practice, this is not
implemented. How many of the 80% of employees at the State
Department who failed to complete the training lost their
security clearance?147 The articles and reports of this number do
not reference anyone losing their clearance. Congress needs to
mandate that the agencies and departments have a hard date
each year for completion of classified material training. If this
date is exceeded, the individual should immediately lose their
security clearance. There are obvious needs for extenuating
circumstances to reinstate the clearance, but these should be the
exception and not the norm. If everyone fully understands what
will happen if you fail to complete the training, then there will
be very few who test the limits of that requirement. The second
issue is that most classified material training is only available
online. Most online training is more of a nuisance than an
opportunity to learn or refresh knowledge. Individuals will

147

Herridge, supra note 19.
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frequently page through the online slides without reading any
of them. In addition, exams that are provided online are also
less than effective. Individuals are free to look up answers prior
to answering. It is noted that references can frequently be used
in real life, but a simple yes/no question that can be answered
with a search function in the electronic file does not really test
knowledge. There should be a requirement for periodic
classroom training for access to classified information. This may
not be feasible every year due to financial and resource
restrictions, but periodic (e.g., every 2 or 3 years) classroom
training is critical to ensure individuals maintain the level of
knowledge necessary to protect the national secrets of the
United States.

D. BETTER PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
WITH RESPECT TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Finally, the public is not informed as to how the
government tries to protect national secrets and national
security. For example, when asked about whether unlawfully
disclosed information is true, an individual in an official
position or with appropriate security clearance can neither
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confirm nor deny.148 This is completely appropriate to protect
information. Denying something is classified in one instance
will inadvertently admit something else is classified when
denial is not provided. However, the public needs to be made
aware that cleared individuals are not allowed to comment so
that national secrets are protected. The government needs some
type of media campaign to inform the public as to why these
national secrets must be protected and that there cannot be any
comment on the information. The biggest thing to explain to the
public is that the information being protected cannot be
disclosed due to national security. Some in the public believe
classification is used to simply hide information from the public
(i.e., the government is keeping something secret because it is
doing something illegal or disliked). In reality, the information
is protected to prevent damage to the safety and security of the
United States. The government must undergo some type of
media campaign to assure the public that the classification of
material is for a good reason. Once the public is convinced, they

148
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will not only support but will require that violators of the law
be punished.

V. CONCLUSIONS
Consolidating the convoluted espionage laws into one
statute will certainly make it easier for prosecutors to determine
the applicable law when prosecuting a case. As currently
written, the statute provides many potential ambiguities that
are frequently challenged in court. While consolidation and
clarification will assist in the prosecution for release of classified
information, the key is to enforce the law consistently across the
board. It should not matter who the individual is, they should
be subject to the same consequences. Until the law is
consistently enforced and applied to everyone, from politicians
and military generals to lower level federal employees and
contractors, there will never be a consistent understanding of
what constitutes a violation of law when classified information
is made available to the public. All individuals with access to
classified information should be able to read and easily
understand the law, be properly trained on the application of
the law, and be subject to severe consequences for violating the
law. This type of application will need to be applied from the
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top down, including Congressmen, politicians, and highranking officials. Classified information is the key to the success
and security of the United States. It must continue to be treated
seriously with violations and unauthorized releases receiving
consistent punishment at all levels. Individuals that have access
to such information must be trained properly and effectively to
ensure they know what they can or cannot do. A key to this
implementation is convincing the public that the classified
information protection is critical to the safety and security of
our nation. These recommendations will serve to strengthen
our security and enhance the safety of the citizens of the United
States.
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Appendix A
18 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
§ 793. Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe
that the information is to be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon,
enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning
any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station,
submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station,
dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine,
telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office,
research laboratory or station or other place connected with the
national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of
construction by the United States or under the control of the
United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies,
or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any
place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other
materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made,
prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or
development, under any contract or agreement with the United
States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person
on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the
United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the
President by proclamation in time of war or in case of national
emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or
Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored,
information as to which prohibited place the President has
determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or
(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or
reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts
to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model,
instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything
connected with the national defense; or
(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or
agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from
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any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal
book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint,
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything
connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason
to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or
attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be
obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary
to the provisions of this chapter; or
(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control
over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code
book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note
relating to the national defense, or information relating to the
national defense which information the possessor has reason to
believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates,
delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or
cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same
to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the
same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee
of the United States entitled to receive it; or
(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or
control over any document, writing, code book, signal book,
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan,
map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the
national defense, or information relating to the national defense
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of
any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits
or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any
person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same
and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United
States entitled to receive it; or
(f) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession
or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book,
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan,
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map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information,
relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence
permits the same to be removed from its proper place of
custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be
lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge
that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place
of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost,
or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt
report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his
superior officer—
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
(g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the
foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment
provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.
(h)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall
forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State
law, any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from any foreign
government, or any faction or party or military or naval force
within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized
by the United States, as the result of such violation. For the
purposes of this subsection, the term “State” includes a State of
the United States, the District of Columbia, and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a
conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the
defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(3) The provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) of
section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)) shall apply
to-(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
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(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such
property, if not inconsistent with this subsection.
(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there shall be
deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all
amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection
remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale
authorized by law.
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Appendix A
18 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-248).
§ 794. Gathering or delivering defense information to aid
foreign government
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to
communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government,
or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a
foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the
United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee,
subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note,
instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national
defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, except that the sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless the jury or, if there is no jury, the court,
further finds that the offense resulted in the identification by a
foreign power (as defined in section 101(a) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) of an individual acting as
an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of
that individual, or directly concerned nuclear weaponry,
military spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other
means of defense or retaliation against largescale attack; war
plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic
information; or any other major weapons system or major
element of defense strategy.
(b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be
communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or
communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with
respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or
disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war
materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or
conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military
operations, or with respect to any works or measures
undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the
fortification or defense of any place, or any other information
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relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the
enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be
subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the
object of such conspiracy.
(d)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall
forfeit to the United States irrespective of any provision of State
law.
(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such
violation, and
(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in
any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, such violation.
For the purposes of this subsection, the term “State” includes a
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a
conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the
defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(3) The provisions of subsections (b), (c) and (e) through (p) of
section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)) shall apply
to-(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such
property, if not inconsistent with this subsection.
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(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there shall be
deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all
amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection
remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale
authorized by law.

